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SEC Rule 105 and Price Discovery in the Secondary Market 
 
ABSTRACT 
Using a bootstrap technique, we compare the speed of the price discovery of SEOs issued 
during the SEC Rule 10b-21 period and those issued during the Rule 105 period on the 
offer day. We make several observations upon the adoption of Rule 105. After the 
adoption of Rule 105, the speed of price discovery slows and becomes less efficient on 
the offer day. We also observe a higher fraction of price discovery attributable to private 
information under Rule 105 that is consistent with the hypothesis that a shortened 
restricted period would lead to difficulty of exploring the information contained in the 
offer price discounts and result in high information asymmetry on the offer day. 
 
Key words: Price discovery; SEC Rule 105 SEOs; Offer day. 
JEL Classification: G14; G18 
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SEC Rule 105 and Price Discovery in the Secondary Market 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The primary objective of the present study is to examine the effects of SEC Rule 105 
on the amount and timing of price discovery in the secondary market during the offer day.  
Rule 105 was adopted by SEC in April 1, 1997 to replace Rule 10b-21. Compared with 
its predecessor, Rule 105 has a shorter restricted period for short sales. It can be argued 
that a shortened restricted period creates a good opportunity for informed short sellers to 
trade prior to the restricted period and cover their positions using shares in the offering. 
This could result in the decrease in information efficiency of pre-offer closing price and 
lead to the difficulty of interpreting the information contained in offer price discounts and 
thus could slow down the speed of price discovery on the offer day. 
The focus of our study is to contrast the SEOs issued during the Rule 10b-21 period 
with those issued during Rule 105 period. We expect the speed of price discovery in these 
two categories of SEOs should be different. Altinkilic et al. (2003) maintain that the 
difference between the actual and predicted discounts, discount surprise, is the most 
important component of information. Positive discount surprise reveals adverse 
information of the firm and investors will adjust their evaluation of the firm’s stock 
downside accordingly. In contrast, negative discount surprise signals favorable 
information that has not been incorporated into stock price and thus should lead to the lift 
of stock price on the offer day. However, if pre-offer price is less informative, it becomes 
harder for investors to judge the accurate information component in discount surprise. 
Under this situation, the price discovery would slow down on the offer day.  
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We investigate the timing and efficiency of offer-day price discovery for SEOs 
issued on both Nasdaq and NYSE from 1993 through 2005. Three issues are examined: 
(1) speed of price adjustment on the offer day, (2) efficiency of price discovery on the 
offer day, and (3) the fraction of price discovery attributable to private information over 
the offer day.  
First, we compare the amount of information that is incorporated into stock price 
during each 15-minute-interval throughout the offer day between SEOs issued under Rule 
10b-21 and SEOs issued under Rule 105. We find that the price discovery for those SEOs 
issued during the Rule 10b-21 period is much faster than those issued during the Rule 
105 period. We observe a higher fraction of price discovery occurs during close-to-open 
period before the adoption of Rule 105. We also find that during the Rule 10b-21 period, 
it takes shorter time to complete 75% of the offer-day price discovery. 
Second, we check the efficiency of price discovery for each 15-minute-interval on 
the offer day. We find that offer-day price discovery for SEOs issued under Rule 105 is 
less efficient than that for SEOs issued under Rule 10b-21. Using the “unbiasedness 
regression” inspired by Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1999), we find that after the adoption of 
Rule 105, the price discovery is not efficient until the last trading hours. In comparison, 
prior to the adoption of Rule 105, during the most time of the offer day, the price 
discovery is efficient, especially during the first trading hour. 
Third, following Hasbrouck (1991a, 1991b)’s technique, we estimate the fraction of 
price discovery attributable to private information. We observe a higher ratio of private 
information to total information after the adoption of Rule 105, which is consistent with 
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the hypothesis that Rule 105 reduces the information efficiency of pre-offer closing price 
and leads to higher information asymmetry on the offer day. 
Overall, the evidence shows that Rule 105 causes the low information efficiency of 
pre-offer stock prices and leads to the difficulty of interpreting the information contained 
in SEO discount and SEO discount surprise, which results in the slow speed and low 
efficiency of price discovery on the offer day. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample 
data and summary statistics. Section 3 examines the amount and timing of price 
discovery on the offer day. Section 4 analyzes the efficiency of offer-day price discovery. 
Section 5 investigates the fraction of price discovery attributable to private information. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. DATA AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
2.1 SAMPLE SELECTION 
We gather our sample of SEO firms from the Securities Data Company (SDC), which 
provides the data related to the offering characteristics of SEO firms, such as offer price, 
offer proceeds, shares issued and number of shares outstanding. The sample consists of 
seasoned equity issues of ordinary common shares on Nasdaq or NYSE from January 
1993 to December 2005. We exclude unit offerings, shelf offerings, closed-end fund, real 
estate investment trust (REIT), and American Depository Receipt (ADR) from our 
sample. Further, we only include the firms with offer prices higher than $5 and firms that 
are in NYSE’s Trade and Quote (TAQ) database or the CRSP database. The final sample 
contains 2553 SEOs, including 1890 Nasdaq SEOs and 663 NYSE SEOs. 
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Intraday data were collected from the NYSE TAQ database. Raw transactions data, 
however, may contain some problems, such as misordered time series and the existence 
of data outside regular trading hours. Therefore, time series data are reordered, and 
observations that lie outside the trading interval between 9:30 am and 16:00 pm Eastern 
Time are not included in the present study. Market information, such as stock prices, 
returns and market capitalization, was obtained from the CRSP database.  
SDC database usually records date of announcing offer prices as offer date. However, 
some firms announce new offer prices after the market closes, and the effective offer date 
should be the next trading day of the SDC offer date. We follow the method suggested by 
Lease et al. (1991) and Corwin (2003) to correct the SDC offer date. Specifically, we 
identify the date following SDC offer date as effective offer date if the trading volume on 
the day following the SDC offer date is more than twice the volume of the SDC offer 
date and more than twice the average daily trading volume over the 250 days prior to the 
offer date. 
 
2.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
<Insert Table 1 here.> 
Table 1 displays summary statistics for firm and offer characteristics for SEOs issued 
under Rule 10b-21 and under Rule 105. Issuing firms that issued after the adoption of 
Rule 105 are larger, with an average market capitalization of $1050.46 million on Nasdaq 
and $2751.59 million on NYSE. Average offer proceeds for SEOs issued under Rule 105 
is much higher due to higher average offer price and higher average offered shares after 
the adoption of Rule 105. 
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<Insert Table 2 here.> 
Table 2 summarizes trading activities and price changes on the offer day for SEOs 
issued under Rule 10b-21 and under Rule 105. NYSE-issued SEOs open later than 
Nasdaq-issued SEOs. On average, NYSE-issued SEOs open 16 minutes after 9:30:00 
open during the Rule 10b-21 period, and open 15 minutes after market open during the 
Rule 105 period. In comparison, Nasdaq-issued SEOs open less than 3 minutes after 
market open during the Rule 10b-21 period, and open less than 1 minute after open 
during the Rule 105 period. We do not observe obvious change in SEO discounts for 
Nasdaq-issued SEOs after the adoption of Rule 105, but we observe a significant increase 
in SEO discounts for those NYSE-issued SEOs. 
For Nasdaq-issued SEOs, the average price change from close to close increases but 
average price change from close to open decreases after the adoption of Rule 105, which 
indicates that a lower portion of price discovery occurs before the market open during the 
Rule 105 period. For NYSE-issued SEOs, we do not observe an obvious change in 
average close-to-close returns, but a large decrease in average close-to-open returns 
during the Rule 105 period. 
For Nasdaq-issued SEOs, the opening trading volume is 0.48% of offered shares 
during the Rule 10b-21 period, but decreases to 0.29% during the Rule 105 period. 
However, the average offer day trading volume increases after the adoption of Rule 105, 
which leads to a lower ratio or opening trading volume and offer-day trading volume 
during the Rule 105 period. For NYSE-issued SEOs, the ratio of opening trading volume 
and offer-day trading volume also decreases during the Rule 105 period. The evidence 
indicates that, after the adoption of Rule 105, fewer traders transact at the market open. 
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Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) suggest that the timing of liquidity trading depends on 
the degree of competition among informed traders and the timing of informed traders 
depends on the degree of concentration of liquidity trading. Specifically, liquidity traders 
tend to trade when opinions of informed traders are homogeneous and the competition 
between informed traders is intense. However, Rule 105 complicates the interpretation of 
information contained in offer prices, which leads to the diversity of informed traders’ 
opinion and weakens the competition among informed traders. The exacerbation of terms 
of trade for liquidity traders results in thin trading of liquidity traders, and this, in turn, 
leads to thin informed trading at the market open. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.1 PRICE DISCOVERY 
In the previous sections, we analyzed the effects of Rule 105 on speed of price 
discovery on the offer day. We expect that Rule 105 would reduce the information 
content of offer prices and would slow down the process of price discovery. In this 
section, we estimate the amount of new information impounded into stock price during 
the each 15-minute-interval for both Rule 10b-21 period and Rule 105 period. 
 
3.1.1 Weighted price contribution (WPC) 
Following Barclay and Warner (1993), Cao et al. (2000) and Barclay and 
Hendershott (2003), the measure used to estimate the amount of price discovery is 
weighted price contribution (WPC) during each period.  
For each 15-minute-interval i, WPC is determined as: 
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where reti,s is the logarithmic price change over interval i for stock s and rets is close-to-
close stock return for stock s. The second term measures the fraction of price change 
during interval i relative to close-to-close return. The first term is the weight that is used 
to measure the contribution of each stock to the total absolute price change of all stocks 
on the offer day.  
<Insert Table 3 here.> 
As noted by Barclay and Warner (1993), the advantage of introducing weighting 
scheme when calculating average price contribution is to lessen the effects of extreme 
values among observations. Specifically, if absolute values of close-to-close return is 
very small, while price change in some interval is relatively large, then fraction of price 
change in that interval will be abnormally high, which will pull up the average price 
contribution in the interval. Weighted price contribution can avoid this problem by 
downweighting observations with low absolute price change on the offer day. However, 
the distribution of weighted mean is unknown, which leads to the difficulty of calculation 
of statistical inferences for weighted average of price contribution and statistical 
comparison of the amount of price discovery between SEOs issued during the Rule 10b-
21 period and those issued during the Rule 105 period. Therefore, we employ bootstrap 
technique to conduct univariate tests for WPC and gauge statistical difference in WPC 
(detail provided in the Appendix).  
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Panel A of Table 3 displays interval-by-interval WPC for close-to-close return for the 
two Nasdaq-issued subsamples conditioned on whether the offer is issued before April 1, 
1997 (Rule 105 implementation date) or not. Two main results can be seen from the 
analysis. First, most offer-day price discovery occurs during close-to-open period, the 
first trading hour and the last trading hour of the offer day. For those stocks issued on 
Nasdaq, about 40% of price discovery occurs prior to the market open, about 20% occurs 
during the first trading hour and about 10% occurs during the last trading hour. Secondly, 
the speeds of price discovery for SEOs issued during the Rule 10b-21 period are much 
faster than those issued during the Rule 105 period. During the Rule 10b-21 period, 
44.66% of price discovery occurs during close-to-open period; in comparison, during the 
Rule 105 period, only 36.86% occurs during close-to-open period. The bootstrap test 
shows that the difference in close-to-open WPC is significant at the 1% level. On a 
further analysis, we find that during the Rule 10b-21 period, the amount of price 
discovery declines rapidly after the open and falls close to zero after ¾ trading hours. 
However, during the Rule 105 period, the price discovery persists almost over the whole 
trading day. 
Panel B of Table 3 displays interval-by-interval WPC for close-to-close return for 
NYSE-issued SEOs during the Rule 10b-21 period and Rule 105 period. Similar to the 
results for Nasdaq-issued stocks, we observe slower price discovery after the adoption of 
Rule 105. During the Rule 10b-21 period, 56.73% of price discovery occurs prior to the 
market open, whereas during the Rule 105 period 52.82% occurs. Furthermore, 
significantly positive price discovery lasts for a shorter time during the Rule 10b-21 
period than that during the Rule 105 period. 
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3.1.2 Cumulative weighted price contribution (Cum_WPC) 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the cumulative weighted price contribution (Cum_WPC) 
based on close-to-close return during each 15-minute interval for Nasdaq-issued SEOs. 
We observe that during the trading hours, the amount of price discovery increases 
monotonically. Notably, the price discovery is faster for those SEOs issued before the 
adoption of Rule 105. During the Rule 10b-21 period, 75% of price discovery has 
completed after 1.5 trading hours; in comparison, during the Rule 105 period, it takes 
2.25 trading hours to complete 75% of price discovery. Furthermore, during the first 
trading hours, the differences in price discovery for the two periods are significant at the 
1% level. The gap shrinks gradually as the time goes by and become insignificant after 
three trading hours. 
<Insert Table 4 here.> 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the cumulative weighted price contribution during each 
15-minute interval for both categories of SEOs. Similar to the results in Panel A, Rule 
105 reduces the speed of price discovery. During the Rule 10b-21 period, it takes less 
than one trading hour to complete 75% of price discovery; however, during the Rule 105 
period, it takes 1.75 hours to complete 75%. 
 
3.2 EFFICIENCY OF PRICE DISCOVERY 
3.2.1 Unbiasedness regression 
Biais et al. (1999) propose that the orders placed during the preopen period could be 
“noisy” or manipulative (noise hypothesis) or could be informative and equal the 
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conditional expectation of the asset value (learning hypothesis). Similarly, the price 
discovery occurred during the trading hours may also be due to the noisy trading of 
liquidity traders. Liquidity trading could result in temporary price move that would 
eventually reserve. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate the informativeness of stock 
prices and the efficiency of price discovery by using the “unbiasedness regression” 
inspired by Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1999). 
The following unbiasedness regression model is estimated: 
iii closepricecloseclose εβα +−+=− )(                                   (2) 
where we refer the closing price of the offer day to new equilibrium value of the asset 
and take offer price as the proxy for old market equilibrium prices. pricei is indicative 
price for each 15-minute interval.  
We estimate the cross-sectional regression for each 15-minute interval. If indicative 
price is conditional expectation of asset value, we are supposed to observe that the slope 
of the coefficient in the model is equal to one. If, otherwise, the price change during the 
first trading hours are mainly the result of noisy trading, the coefficient of the model is 
expected to be significantly different from 1.  
<Insert Table 5 here.> 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the slope coefficients in the model for the Nasdaq-issued 
SEOs. It can be observed that before the adoption of Rule 105, during the first and the 
last trading hours, the slope coefficients are not significantly different from 1, which 
indicates that the trading activities are informative and stock prices are efficient during 
these periods. In comparison, after the adoption of Rule 105, the slope coefficients are 
different from 1 until the last trading hour before the market close, which indicates that 
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during the most time of the trading period, the price discovery is less efficient. 
Furthermore, the bootstrap test for difference in slope coefficients between Rule 10b-21 
period and Rule 105 period suggests that the offer-day price discovery during the Rule 
10b-21 period is more efficient than those during the Rule 105 period. 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the slope coefficients for the NYSE-issued SEOs. Similar 
to the results for Nasdaq-issued SEOs, we find that the offer-day price discovery prior to 
the adoption of Rule 105 is more efficient than that after the adoption of Rule 105. 
During the Rule 10b-21 period, the slope coefficients for each interval are all not 
significantly different from 1, whereas during the Rule 105 period, the slope coefficients 
are only close to 1 during the first half and the last one trading hours. The bootstrap test 
further corroborates that the offer-day price discovery is more efficient during the Rule 
10b-21 period. 
In addition, we estimate the adjusted R-squares for each interval and for each 
category of SEOs. Adjusted R-square can reflect the uncertainty remaining about the 
equilibrium of stock value after we take into account the information contained in the 
indicative stock prices. The uncertainty should decrease when more information is 
embedded into stock prices and thus the adjusted R-square should increase accordingly.  
From Panel A of Table 5, we observe that R-squares for both categories of SEOs 
increase monotonically during the trading hours. During the Rule 10b-21 period, the R-
square increases rapidly from 0.51 to 0.81 during the first 1.5 trading hours, and after 
11:00 am, the R-square continues to increase but the increasing speed slows down 
obviously until it reaches 1 at the market close. In comparison, during the Rule 105 
period, the R-square rises rapidly from 0.42 to 0.80 during the first two trading hours and 
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the speed of increase slows down after that. In particular, during the first 1.5 trading 
hours, the adjusted R-square for those SEOs issued during the Rule 10b-21 period is 
significantly higher than those for SEOs issued during the Rule 105 period. All of these 
evidences show that the efficient price discovery for SEOs issued during the Rule 10b-21 
period occurs much later than that for SEOs issued during the Rule 105 period. The 
results for NYSE-issued SEOs are similar to those for Nasdaq-issued SEOs. 
 
3.2.2 Convergence of stock price to equilibrium asset value 
We mention in last section that when more and more information are impounded into 
stock price, stock price should be closer and closer to the market equilibrium asset value. 
Therefore, we should observe convergence tendency between stock price and close price 
during the offer day.  
We measure the extent of divergence between stock price and offer-day closing price 
using the following formula: 
))/(log( ii pricecloseabsdivergence =                                      (3) 
where close is the closing price of the offer day, and pricei is price at the end of each 15-
minute interval.  
<Insert Table 6 here.> 
Panel A of Table 6 reports the extents of divergence to the offer day’s closing price 
in each 15-minute interval for Nasdaq-issued SEOs. We find that divergence between 
stock price and closing price shrinks quickly during the two trading hours after the 
market open. In particular, the divergences of those SEOs issued before the adoption of 
Rule 105 are much smaller than those of SEOs issued after that. During the Rule 10b-21 
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period, the average divergence has been shrunk to 2.86 at the market open. However, 
during the Rule 105 period, the average divergence is 3.98. Until the last half trading 
hour, the divergences for Nasdaq-issued SEOs are much lower than those for NYSE-
issued SEOs. 
Similar results can be observed for NYSE-issued SEOs from Panel B of Table 6. At 
the market open, the average divergence between stock price and offer-day closing price 
for those SEOs issued during the Rule 10b-21 period is 1.39, compared with 1.91 for 
those SEOs issued during the Rule 105 period. Furthermore, throughout the offer day, the 
divergences for SEOs issued during the Rule 10b-21 period are much lower than those 
for SEOs issued during the Rule 105 period. 
 
3.3 PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE INFORMATION 
Because of the implementation of Rule 105, pre-offer prices become less informative, 
which leads to the difficulty of interpreting the information contained in the offer prices. 
Therefore, during the Rule 105 period, the ratio of public information on the offer day 
should be relatively lower than that during the Rule 10b-21 period.  
In this section, we decompose information into its public and private components 
following Hasbrouck (1991a, 1991b)’s technique. We estimate the following VAR 
models for each category of SEOs: 
∑ ∑ ++=
= =
−−
p
i
p
i
titiitit xrr
1 0
,1εβα                                           (4) 
∑ ∑ ++=
= =
−−
p
i
p
i
titiitit xrx
1 0
,2εδγ                                         (5) 
 16 
where rt denotes the percent change (in logarithm) in the quote midpoint subsequent to 
the t-th transaction. xt denotes the trading direction inferred by Lee and Ready (1991)’s 
method, which equals 1 for a buyer-initiated order and equals 0 for a seller-initiated order. 
The lags used in the equations are 10. 
<Insert Table 7 here.> 
Table 7 reports the ratio of private information to total information (σx
2/σv
2) for each 
category of SEOs. Consistent with our expectation, the ratio of private information to 
total information rises after the adoption of Rule 105. For those SEOs issued in Nasdaq, 
the fraction of price discovery attributable to private information is 8.03% during the 
Rule 10b-21 period, compared with 14.68% during the Rule 105 period. For NYSE-
issued SEOs, the ratio of private information rises from 29.07% to 32.73% after the 
adoption of Rule 105. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In 1997, SEC adopted Rule 105 to shorten the restricted period of short sales in order 
to reduce the adverse effects on informed short sales. However, the shortened restricted 
period provides informed traders an opportunity to trade in a relatively narrow span of 
time immediately prior to the beginning of restricted period so that they can cover their 
short positions using offering shares. The timing of informed trading would lead to the 
lower information efficiency of pre-offer stock prices, and lead to the difficulty of 
interpreting the information component in the offer price discounts, which could slow 
down the price discovery on the offer date. 
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Using a bootstrap technique, we compare the speed of the price discovery of SEO 
issued during the Rule 10b-21 period and those issued during the Rule 105 period 
through the offer day. We observe a substantial decrease in the speed of price discovery 
after the adoption of Rule 105. We also find that, after the adoption of Rule 105, the 
trades during the offer day have large temporary price impacts that introduce noise in the 
stock prices and the price discovery is less efficient than that under Rule 10b-21. In 
addition, the convergences of stock prices to equilibrium asset values are lagged under 
Rule 105. Furthermore, we show that a higher fraction of price discovery attributable to 
private information under Rule 105 which is consistent with our hypothesis that 
shortened restricted period would lead to the difficulty of exploring the information 
contained in the offer price discounts and result in the high information asymmetry on the 
offer day. 
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APPENDIX 
We generate a bootstrap distribution under the null hypothesis of no difference of 
information efficiency of pre-offer stock price between Rule 10b-21 period and Rule 105 
period. We merge the sample of 851 (311) Nasdaq (NYSE) SEOs issued before the 
adoption of Rule 105 and the sample of 1039 (352) Nasdaq (NYSE) SEOs issued after 
the adoption of Rule 105 together. Take a sample of 851 (311) SEOs randomly (with 
replacement) from the combined sample as “Rule 10b-21” sample and similarly draw a 
sample of 1039 (352) SEOs as “Rule 105” sample. We then calculate weighted average 
price discovery, convergence of stock price to equilibrium value and run Biais, Hillion, 
and Spatt (1999)’s unbiasedness regression model to get β and adjusted R-square. We 
repeat this procedure 2,000 times to build up a distribution of sample statistics under the 
null hypothesis that the distribution of sample statistics for “Rule 10b-21” sample is the 
same as the distribution for “Rule 105” sample. The test on difference of sample statistics 
is one-sided. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Seasoned Offers 
 
This table presents means [medians] for a sample of 2553 seasoned offers issued on Nasdaq or NYSE from 
January 1993 to December 2005. The statistics for Nasdaq-issued SEOs are reported in Panel A and the 
statistics for NYSE-issued SEOs are reported in Panel B. The sample is divided conditioned on whether the 
offer is issued before April 1, 1997 (Rule 105 implementation date) or not. The p-value is from a test of the 
restriction that means [medians] are equal across subperiod based on t-test [wilcoxon test]. Market 
capitalization equals the closing price times the number of shares outstanding of the day prior to the offer. 
Offer proceeds equals the offer price times the number of offered shares. 
 
  By Category  
 All Rule 10b-21 Rule 105 p-value 
Panel A: Nasdaq      
Number of SEOs 1890 851 1039  
Market Capitalization ($ mil.) 730.10 [281.78] 
338.96 
[194.53] 
1050.46 
[339.29] 
0.00 
[0.00] 
Offer Price ($) 27.44 [22.00] 
22.10 
[20.00] 
31.81 
[23.75] 
0.00 
[0.00] 
Offered Shares ($ mil.) 2.31 [2.00] 
1.92 
[1.70] 
2.62 
[2.10] 
0.00 
[0.00] 
Offer Proceeds ($ mil.) 87.99 [55.50] 
56.10 
[41.60] 
114.11 
[71.00] 
0.00 
[0.00] 
Panel B: NYSE      
Number of SEOs 663 311 352  
Market Capitalization ($ mil.) 2084.25 [783.48] 
1328.94 
[630.21] 
2751.59 
[995.94] 
0.00 
[0.00] 
Offer Price ($) 30.96 [27.31] 
29.41 
[27.75] 
32.32 
[26.98] 
0.03 
[0.67] 
Offered Shares ($ mil.) 4.56 [3.00] 
3.73 
[2.50] 
5.32 
[3.29] 
0.00 
[0.00] 
Offered Proceeds ($ mil.) 186.84 [113.90] 
134.66 
[84.70] 
232.94 
[137.05] 
0.00 
[0.00] 
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Table 2 
Trading Activity and Price Change for SEOs 
 
This table presents means [medians] for a sample of 2553 seasoned offers issued on Nasdaq or NYSE from 
January 1993 to December 2005. The statistics for Nasdaq-issued SEOs are reported in Panel A and the 
statistics for NYSE-issued SEOs are reported in Panel B. The sample is divided conditioned on whether the 
offer is issued before April 1, 1997 (Rule 105 implementation date) or not. The p-value is from a test of the 
restriction that means [medians] are equal across subperiod based on t-test [wilcoxon test]. Opening delay 
is the number of minutes from 9:30:00 to the opening trade. SEO discount is defined as -1 times the return 
from the previous day’s closing transaction price to the offer price. Close-to-close return is defined as the 
return from the previous day’s closing transaction price to the offer day’s closing transaction price. Close-
to-open return is defined as the return from the previous day’s closing transaction price to the offer day’s 
opening transaction price. Opening trading volume is the number of shares traded in the opening trade. Day 
1 trading volume is the number of shares traded on the offer day. 
 
 By Category  
 Rule 10b-21 Rule 105 p-value 
Panel A: Nasdaq    
Opening Delay (min) 2.70 [0.52] 
0.82 
[0.08] 
0.00 
[0.00] 
SEO Discount (%) 3.22 [2.29] 
3.14 
[2.32] 
0.63 
[0.74] 
Close-to-close Return (%) -0.37 [-0.63] 
0.75 
[-0.05] 
0.00 
[0.15] 
Close-to-open Return (%) -1.51 [-1.10] 
-0.89 
[-0.44] 
0.00 
[0.00] 
Opening Trading Volume  
(% of offered shares ) 
0.48 
[0.06] 
0.29 
[0.03] 
0.29 
[0.00] 
Day 1 Trading Volume  
(% of offered shares) 
112.18 
[61.43] 
131.91 
[78.22] 
0.33 
[0.00] 
Panel B: NYSE     
Opening Delay (min) 16.54 [13.05] 
15.05 
[10.24] 
0.32 
[0.00] 
SEO Discount (%) 1.10 [0.43] 
1.80 
[0.99] 
0.00 
[0.00] 
Close-to-close Return (%) 0.39 [0.00] 
0.32 
[-0.21] 
0.82 
[0.17] 
Close-to-open Return (%) -0.22 [0.00] 
0.05 
[0.00] 
0.23 
[0.80] 
Opening Trading Volume  
(% of offered shares ) 
20.02 
[11.97] 
34.94 
[11.88] 
0.33 
[0.93] 
Day 1 Trading Volume  
(% of offered shares) 
58.19 
[38.66] 
110.95 
[52.29] 
0.19 
[0.00] 
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Table 3 
Weighted Price Contribution from Close to Close by Time Period 
 
This Table presents the weighted price contribution of each 15-minute-interval to the close-to-close return 
for a sample of 2553 seasoned offers issued on Nasdaq or NYSE from January 1993 to December 2005. 
For each 15-minute-interval i the weighted price contribution is calculated as follows: 
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where reti,s is the logarithmic price change over interval i for stock s and rets is close-to-close stock return 
for stock s. The statistics for Nasdaq-issued SEOs are reported in Panel A and the statistics for NYSE-
issued SEOs are reported in Panel B. The sample is divided conditioned on whether the offer is issued 
before April 1, 1997 (Rule 105 implementation date) or not. Values that are significantly larger than zero at 
the 0.05 level are denoted with an *. The p-value is from a test of the restriction that weighted price 
contributions are equal across subperiod based on bootstrap test. p-values that are lower than 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 are denoted with *, **,  and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Nasdaq    
 
15-minute-interval Rule 10b-21 Rule 105 p-value (bootstrap) 
Close to open 44.66* 36.86* *** 
1 14.64* 13.57*  
2 3.42* 5.40*  
3 4.62* 3.98*  
4 1.79 3.59*  
5 2.53 1.49  
6 0.85 2.07*  
7 1.33 2.24*  
8 1.66 1.85*  
9 1.40 1.62*  
10 2.56* 1.77*  
11 -0.54 1.27* * 
12 1.44 1.41*  
13 -0.41 1.44* * 
14 0.76 1.01  
15 1.60 1.09  
16 -0.17 1.42*  
17 2.14 1.11  
18 -0.94 0.75  
19 2.74* 1.80*  
20 2.16 1.81*  
21 0.78 1.79*  
22 0.23 1.20  
23 1.55 2.96*  
24 2.11 1.95*  
25 2.73* 3.20*  
26 4.33* 1.34 ** 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: NYSE    
 
15-minute-interval Rule 10b-21 Rule 105 p-value (bootstrap) 
    
Close to open 56.73* 52.82*  
1 0.02 2.16  
2 8.20* 5.51*  
3 4.02* 4.87*  
4 2.52 2.89*  
5 2.04 1.05  
6 2.61* 0.80  
7 -1.45 2.00* *** 
8 0.83 1.89*  
9 0.48 1.04  
10 3.32* 1.50 *** 
11 1.88 2.14*  
12 0.66 1.98*  
13 1.61 1.08  
14 0.44 0.11  
15 1.78 1.07  
16 0.65 0.85  
17 1.91 0.90  
18 1.54 1.35  
19 1.79 1.75*  
20 1.07 1.40  
21 0.51 1.93  
22 -0.20 2.63* ** 
23 2.62* 1.75  
24 3.42 1.43  
25 2.54* 3.02*  
26 -1.53 0.08  
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Table 4 
Cumulative Weighted Price Contribution from Close to Close by Time Period 
 
This Table presents the cumulative weighted price contribution of each 15-minute-interval to the close-to-
close return for a sample of 2553 seasoned offers issued on Nasdaq or NYSE from January 1993 to 
December 2005. For each 15-minute-interval i the weighted price contribution is calculated as follows: 
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where reti,s is the logarithmic price change over interval i for stock s and rets is close-to-close stock return 
for stock s. The statistics for Nasdaq-issued SEOs are reported in Panel A and the statistics for NYSE-
issued SEOs are reported in Panel B. The sample is divided conditioned on whether the offer is issued 
before April 1, 1997 (Rule 105 implementation date) or not. Values that are significantly larger than 75 at 
the 0.05 level are denoted with an *. The p-value is from a test of the restriction that weighted price 
contributions are equal across subperiod based on bootstrap test. p-values that are lower than 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 are denoted with *, **,  and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Nasdaq    
15-minute-interval Rule 10b-21 Rule 105 p-value  (bootstrap) 
Close to open 44.66 36.86 *** 
1 59.30 50.43 *** 
2 62.73 55.83 *** 
3 67.35 59.81 *** 
4 69.14 63.40 ** 
5 71.67 64.89 *** 
6 72.52* 66.96 ** 
7 73.84* 69.21 ** 
8 75.51* 71.06 ** 
9 76.91* 72.68* ** 
10 79.47* 74.44* *** 
11 78.93* 75.72* * 
12 80.37* 77.13* * 
13 79.97* 78.57*  
14 80.73* 79.58*  
15 82.33* 80.67*  
16 82.16* 82.09*  
17 84.30* 83.20*  
18 83.36* 83.95*  
19 86.10* 85.75*  
20 88.27* 87.56*  
21 89.04* 89.35*  
22 89.28* 90.55*  
23 90.83* 93.51*  
24 92.94* 95.46*  
25 95.67* 98.66*  
26 100.00* 100.00* - 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: NYSE    
15-minute-interval Rule 10b-21 Rule 105 p-value  (bootstrap) 
Close to open 56.73 52.82  
1 56.76 54.97  
2 64.96 60.49  
3 68.98 65.36  
4 71.50* 68.24  
5 73.54* 69.29  
6 76.14* 70.09 * 
7 74.70* 72.10*  
8 75.52* 73.98*  
9 76.01* 75.02*  
10 79.33* 76.52*  
11 81.21* 78.67*  
12 81.87* 80.65*  
13 83.47* 81.73*  
14 83.91* 81.84*  
15 85.69* 82.91*  
16 86.34* 83.76*  
17 88.25* 84.67*  
18 89.79* 86.01* * 
19 91.58* 87.76* * 
20 92.65* 89.16* * 
21 93.16* 91.09*  
22 92.96* 93.72*  
23 95.58* 95.47*  
24 99.00* 96.90*  
25 101.53* 99.92*  
26 100.00* 100.00* - 
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Table 5 
Unbiasedness Regressions by Time Period 
 
This Table presents the slope coefficients and adjusted R-squares of unbiasedness regressions for each 15-
minute-interval for a sample of 2553 seasoned offers issued on Nasdaq or NYSE from January 1993 to 
December 2005. For each 15-minute-interval i , the following regression model is estimated: 
iii closepricecloseclose εβα +−+=− )(  
The statistics for Nasdaq-issued SEOs are reported in Panel A and the statistics for NYSE-issued SEOs are 
reported in Panel B. The sample is divided conditioned on whether the offer is issued before April 1, 1997 
(Rule 105 implementation date) or not. Slope coefficients that are significantly larger than 1 at the 0.05 
level are denoted with an *. The p-value is from a test of the restriction that weighted price contributions 
are equal across subperiod based on bootstrap test. p-values that are lower than 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 are 
denoted with *, **,  and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Nasdaq   
 Slope Coefficient (β)  Adjusted R-square (Adj. R2) 
15-minute-
interval 
Rule 
10b-21 Rule 105 
p-value 
(bootstrap)  
Rule 10b-
21 Rule 105 
p-value 
(bootstrap) 
Close to open 1.02 1.22* ***  0.51 0.42 ** 
1 1.02 1.24* ***  0.64 0.58 * 
2 1.03 1.22* ***  0.68 0.64 * 
3 1.05 1.21* ***  0.73 0.68 * 
4 1.05* 1.19* ***  0.75 0.71 * 
5 1.06* 1.21* ***  0.78 0.74 * 
6 1.08* 1.19* ***  0.81 0.76 ** 
7 1.07* 1.18* ***  0.82 0.78 ** 
8 1.05* 1.18* ***  0.82 0.80  
9 1.05* 1.17* ***  0.83 0.82  
10 1.07* 1.16* ***  0.86 0.82 *** 
11 1.08* 1.14* **  0.86 0.83 ** 
12 1.07* 1.13* **  0.86 0.84 * 
13 1.06* 1.13* **  0.86 0.85  
14 1.05* 1.12* **  0.86 0.86  
15 1.06* 1.11* **  0.87 0.87  
16 1.06* 1.10* *  0.88 0.88  
17 1.05* 1.10* **  0.88 0.89  
18 1.05* 1.09* *  0.88 0.89  
19 1.03 1.08* **  0.90 0.90  
20 1.03 1.07* **  0.91 0.91  
21 1.02 1.05*   0.92 0.92  
22 1.03* 1.05*   0.92 0.93  
23 1.02 1.02   0.93 0.94  
24 1.01 1.02   0.94 0.95  
25 0.98 0.99   0.94 0.97  
26 1.00 1.00 -  1.00 1.00 - 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: NYSE    
 Slope Coefficient (β)  Adjusted R-square (Adj. R2) 
15-minute-
interval 
Rule 10b-
21 Rule 105 
p-value 
(bootstrap)  
Rule 10b-
21 Rule 105 
p-value 
(bootstrap) 
Close to open 1.03 1.08   0.74 0.59 * 
1 1.04 1.11   0.75 0.61 * 
2 1.03 1.14* *  0.78 0.66  
3 1.05 1.16* *  0.83 0.72 * 
4 1.06 1.13*   0.85 0.75 * 
5 1.06 1.13*   0.86 0.76 * 
6 1.05 1.15* *  0.87 0.79 * 
7 1.06 1.15* *  0.87 0.81  
8 1.07 1.13*   0.89 0.82  
9 1.07 1.13*   0.90 0.83 * 
10 1.06 1.13*   0.90 0.84 * 
11 1.05 1.13* *  0.92 0.86 * 
12 1.05 1.11*   0.92 0.87 * 
13 1.04 1.10* *  0.92 0.88  
14 1.05 1.11*   0.92 0.89  
15 1.04 1.11* *  0.93 0.90  
16 1.02 1.10* **  0.93 0.89  
17 1.02 1.11* **  0.94 0.90 * 
18 1.01 1.09* **  0.94 0.90 * 
19 1.00 1.08* **  0.95 0.92  
20 1.00 1.07* **  0.95 0.93  
21 1.00 1.06* **  0.96 0.93 ** 
22 1.02 1.03   0.97 0.95 ** 
23 1.00 1.02   0.97 0.96  
24 0.96 1.01   0.95 0.98  
25 0.96 0.99   0.96 0.99  
26 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 - 
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Table 6 
Convergence of Stock Price to Equilibrium Value by Time Period 
 
This Table presents the average convergence of stock price to equilibrium value of each 15-minute-interval 
for a sample of 2553 seasoned offers issued on Nasdaq or NYSE from January 1993 to December 2005. 
The extent of divergence between stock price and offer-day closing price using the following formula: 
))/(log( ii pricecloseabsdivergence =  
where close is the closing price of the offer day, and pricei is price at the end of each 15-minute interval. 
The statistics for Nasdaq-issued SEOs are reported in Panel A and the statistics for NYSE-issued SEOs are 
reported in Panel B. The sample is divided conditioned on whether the offer is issued before April 1, 1997 
(Rule 105 implementation date) or not. The p-value is from a test of the restriction that weighted price 
contributions are equal across subperiod based on bootstrap test. p-values that are lower than 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 are denoted with *, **,  and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Nasdaq    
15-minute-interval Rule 10b-21 Rule 105 p-value  (bootstrap) 
    
Close to open 2.86 3.98 *** 
1 2.46 3.28 *** 
2 2.24 2.98 *** 
3 2.02 2.83 *** 
4 1.95 2.71 *** 
5 1.83 2.56 *** 
6 1.75 2.47 *** 
7 1.66 2.36 *** 
8 1.64 2.26 *** 
9 1.59 2.15 *** 
10 1.47 2.09 *** 
11 1.47 2.01 *** 
12 1.43 1.94 *** 
13 1.46 1.87 *** 
14 1.46 1.83 *** 
15 1.37 1.75 *** 
16 1.30 1.69 *** 
17 1.31 1.62 *** 
18 1.28 1.60 *** 
19 1.18 1.54 *** 
20 1.12 1.43 *** 
21 1.09 1.35 *** 
22 1.02 1.27 *** 
23 0.96 1.14 *** 
24 0.85 1.01 *** 
25 0.78 0.79  
26 0.00 0.00 - 
 
 
 29 
Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: NYSE    
15-minute-interval Rule 10b-21 Rule 105 p-value  (bootstrap) 
Close to open 1.39 1.91 *** 
1 1.37 1.82 *** 
2 1.25 1.67 *** 
3 1.12 1.54 *** 
4 1.04 1.43 *** 
5 0.96 1.37 *** 
6 0.93 1.32 *** 
7 0.93 1.25 *** 
8 0.87 1.22 *** 
9 0.85 1.18 *** 
10 0.81 1.14 *** 
11 0.73 1.10 *** 
12 0.71 1.05 *** 
13 0.70 1.03 *** 
14 0.71 1.00 *** 
15 0.67 0.96 *** 
16 0.65 0.96 *** 
17 0.59 0.93 *** 
18 0.58 0.91 *** 
19 0.56 0.86 *** 
20 0.53 0.81 *** 
21 0.49 0.75 *** 
22 0.41 0.64 *** 
23 0.38 0.54 *** 
24 0.32 0.44 *** 
25 0.19 0.24  
26 0.00 0.00 - 
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Table 7 
Public and Private Information: Variance Decomposition 
 
This table presents the means [medians] of variance component of stock prices on the offer day for a 
sample of 2553 seasoned offers issued on Nasdaq or NYSE from January 1993 to December 2005. The 
statistics for Nasdaq-issued SEOs are reported in Panel A and the statistics for NYSE-issued SEOs are 
reported in Panel B. The sample is divided conditioned on whether the offer is issued before April 1, 1997 
(Rule 105 implementation date) or not. The following VAR system for quote revisions and trades are 
estimated: 
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where rt denotes the percent change (in logarithm) in the quote midpoint subsequent to the t-th transaction. 
xt denotes the trading direction inferred by Lee and Ready (1991)’s method, which equals 1 for a buyer-
initiated order and equals 0 for a seller-initiated order. The lags used in the equations are 10. 
 
 σx2/σv2 
 Rule 10b-21 Rule 105 p-value 
Nasdaq 8.03 [4.80] 
14.68 
[13.83] 
0.00 
[0.00] 
NYSE 29.07 [27.15] 
32.73 
[32.60] 
0.00 
[0.00] 
 
 
 
